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AbstrAct – In this paper I argue that the existence of expert knowledge 
potentially poses a problem for Evidentialism, the view that a person’s 
justification supervenes on the evidence this person has. An expert is 
the kind of person from which knowledge (or justified belief) is expected 
in situations in which a non-expert would normally not attain knowledge 
(or justified belief); so, potentially, the epistemic status of their beliefs 
differ even if the evidence they possess seems to be the same. A viable 
solution to this problem has to show that, appearances to the contrary, 
the expert and the non-expert, in the problematic cases, do not possess 
the same evidence. I propose a solution to this problem by defending a 
principle that specifies the conditions under which a piece of information 
should be counted as evidence.
KEywords – Expert knowledge. Evidentialism. Evidence. Epistemic 
justification. Information. Perception.
rEsumo – Neste estudo, argumento que a existência do conhecimento por 
especialista potencialmente coloca um problema para o evidencialismo, 
a visão de que a justificação que uma pessoa tem sobrevem à evidência 
que essa pessoa possui. um especialista é o tipo de pessoa a partir de 
quem o conhecimento (ou a crença justificada) é esperado em situações 
em que um não-especialista normalmente não atingiria o conhecimento 
(ou a crença justificada). Assim, potencialmente, o estatuto epistêmico 
das crenças deles diferem, mesmo que a evidência que possuem pareça 
ser a mesma. uma solução viável a esse problema tem de mostrar que, 
apesar das aparências, o especialista e o não-especialista, nos casos 
problemáticos, não possuem a mesma evidência. Proponho uma solução 
a esse problema, ao defender um princípio que especifica as condições 
sob as quais um item de informação deveria contar como evidência.
PAlAvrAs-chAvE – conhecimento por especialista. Evidencialismo. 
Evidência. Justificação epistêmica. Informação. Percepção.
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Evidentialism about epistemic justification is the view that the 
(quantity of) justification a subject has for believing a given proposition 
depends on the evidence that person possesses. more in particular, the 
idea is conveyed by the following principle:
EJ      doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified 
for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has 
at t. (c&F 2004: 83)
As such, this view is committal to the claim that whenever two 
subjects have different degrees of justification for believing the same 
proposition, this must depend on a difference between the evidence 
the first and the second possesses; that which implies, in particular, 
that whenever two persons believe the same proposition, and just 
the first knows it because she has a stronger justification, this will 
have to be explained in terms of a difference in the evidence both   
possess. 
In this paper, I want to explore an implication of EJ that, on the 
face of the intuitive character of this principle, would seem to be rather 
problematic. under a rather uncontroversial characterization, a subject S 
can be regarded as an expert in some domain dom if, for some p ranging 
on some feature of the environment that is central to dom, S may attain 
knowledge that p in situations in which a different subject S1, who is 
not an expert in dom, could not attain knowledge of p. this different 
propensity to attain knowledge (form justified belief) is what in principle 
reveals S’s expertise in dom, and S1’s lack of expertise in this domain.   
central, to this characterization, is the idea of a situation’s being the 
same. It is because S and S1 are in the same situation that their different 
epistemic performances reveal their different expertise in the domain. 
the expert is precisely the one who knows (or form a justified belief) 
when the non-expert, at the very best, may just attain true belief. If this 
characterization of expertise is accepted, it is not difficult to figure out 
what the offending implication of EJ anticipated above may be. For it is 
intuitive to think that the same situation in which the expert possibly 
knows (forms a justified belief) and the non-expert doesn’t is to be 
specified in informational terms. In other words, it is intuitive to think 
that the expert is the subject who potentially knows (forms a justified 
belief) when the information which is available to her is the same as the 
information available to the non-expert, who doesn’t know (doesn’t forma 
justified belief); and if the informational situation in which the expert 
knows and the non-expert does not know is the same, how could there 
be a difference in the evidence they possess which explains the different T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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epistemic status of what they eventually come to believe? Indeed, it is not 
difficult to imagine situations in which an expert, by solely considering 
some piece of perceptual evidence, may come to know something falling 
within her area of expertise which a non-expert would not come to know 
even if, by mere chance, she were to form a true belief on the basis of the 
very same evidence. As an example, just imagine an expert bird-watcher 
briefly looking at a bird, and concluding on the sole basis of what she 
sees that it is an X, and compare this with a novice who transitions to 
the same conclusion on the basis of the same evidence; if the bird is 
really an X, it seems safe to maintain that the expert comes to know this 
fact; yet the expert has the same evidence as the non-expert, to which 
it does not seem intuitive to attribute knowledge of the fact that the bird 
is an X: whence the tentative conclusion that the difference among the 
expert and the non-expert, at least in the case under discussion, could 
not be accounted for in terms of the different amount of evidence they 
possess.
In the face of similar scenarios, contemporary evidentialists have 
reacted by contending that the difference among the expert and the 
non-expert still admits an explanation proceeding in evidential terms: 
despite impressions to the contrary, the expert has always more evidence 
than the non-expert, and in particular some knowledge about her area of 
expertise which, although temporarily set in the background, nonetheless 
makes the difference with respect to the non-expert (who does not 
possess that knowledge). the main difficulty with the reply at issue, 
from an Evidentialist point of view, is however that evidence temporarily 
set in the back-ground, as contrasted with the evidence which a subject 
is currently aware of, may not necessarily qualify as evidence which is 
“possessed”; and so, that it could not be invoked to explain the different 
justificatory status of the expert and the non-expert’s beliefs, which is 
claimed to supervene on the evidence they have1.
1  r. Feldman contends that, in so far as the relevant background knowledge actively 
sustains the expert’s belief, it should be counted as evidence possessed, despite 
its unconscious nature (2004: 239). so he tentatively draws the conclusion that a 
subject might be currently thinking of some evidence, and hence possess it, even if 
thinking of it unconsciously. I doubt that this solution may offer to the Evidentialist 
any effective way out: in the very first place, in fact, it is not very clear what it does 
mean for an unconscious belief actively to sustain a second belief; to say that it does 
so, in the absence of any further specification, may just seem to be an alternative way 
of describing the intuitive fact the expert’s  background knowledge somehow makes 
a difference for the justificatory status of her classificatory belief. how this should be 
explained, however, is precisely what is at stake among the Evidentialist, who contends 
that it contributes qua evidence possessed, and those who oppose Evidentialism on 
the ground that, given its unconscious nature, its contribution could not be understoodT. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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this difficulty, in many cases, can be overcome by adverting to 
a dispositional sense in which a subject can be credited with the 
possession of evidence, and so with justification: if a subject has already 
gathered some evidence E, and in spite of failing to currently consider 
this evidence retains the disposition to retrieve it when a question to 
which it is highly pertinent arises, then no principled difficulty seems to 
stand in the way of crediting a subject with the dispositional possession 
of E, and then with (dispositional) justification which E may happen to 
bestow on her beliefs. For instance, the dispositional sense in which 
some evidence may be possessed can be used to explain, consistently 
with Evidentialism, the knowledge-status of many stored beliefs for 
which a subject is currently considering no evidence: these beliefs 
will qualify as knowledge to the extent to which it will be reasonable 
to credit the subject who (dispositionally) entertains them with the 
dispositional possession of the relevant evidence. In the same way, it 
could be suggested, an expert transitioning to the true belief that p on 
the sole basis of a given piece of perceptual evidence will be justified 
to a degree sufficient for knowledge in believing that p provided that 
it will be reasonable to credit her with the dispositional possession of 
the relevant additional evidence; and a non-expert, transitioning from 
the same perceptual evidence to the belief that p will not come in that 
way to know this proposition because she will not possess the relevant 
evidence, either currently, or dispositionally.
one problem with this line of resistance is however the following: the 
idea that dispositional evidence may make the difference with respect to 
the justificatory status of a belief which is unsupported in the most central 
(occurrent) sense owes its credibility to counterfactual considerations; 
the idea is that, although that evidence is not used to justify a given 
belief, it would be made available and used if a question with respect 
to which it is pertinent did arise. more precisely, the principle which 
governs the notion of dispositional justification seems to be something 
like the following:
  in that way. so, Feldman might be charged of begging her opponent’s question when 
he substantiates the view that unconscious evidence may be evidence possessed in 
light of the observation that this evidence may at times actively sustain other beliefs. 
moreover, it might be contended that the most central feature of evidence possessed 
which makes it an ideal candidate for making the difference for the justificatory status 
of a belief is that it is evidence of which a subject is currently aware; the problem, once 
this is accepted, is that although there is a reasonable sense in which it could be said 
that something is being thought unconsciously, no similar sense seems to sustain the 
suggestion that something might be the object of an unconscious awareness.T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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(d-j***)  If the o-evidence E would justify the belief that p, the d-evidence 
E d-justifies the belief that p. (Piazza 2009)
For instance, the reason why I can be credited dispositional knowledge 
of the name of my mother-in-law even if, absorbed by different things, 
I am currently entertaining no evidence bearing on that issue is that, if 
asked, I could readily retrieve the pertinent information and return, on 
its basis, the fully (and then occurrently) justified answer that her name 
is carla. In the case of an expert which forms a belief on the sole basis 
of perceptual evidence, however, it could not do to essay an explanation 
of the belief’s knowledge-status which relied on the observation that 
she has background knowledge, and so that she possesses (additional) 
dispositional evidence: for the very good reason that the expert does 
know occurrently what she comes to believe on the basis of the perceptual 
evidence she is aware of, and the best we can expect from dispositional 
evidence is dispositional justification, and, only under certain conditions, 
dispositional knowledge. so, although it may be true that the expert will 
have d-evidence which the non-expert will fail to have, and so – contrary 
to the initial assumption – it will be true that the expert possesses a larger 
amount of evidence, it will be nonetheless the case that the evidence 
which could explain the different justificatory status of their respective 
beliefs will be the same; and this could well seem enough to counter, on 
a principled basis, the general principle advertised above.
A better strategy, it could be suggested, would then seem to need 
quite different materials. Just consider the following suggestion: so 
far, the expert and the non-expert have been shown to have the same 
evidence (at least that which is relevant to the occurrent justificatory 
status of the beliefs they entertain) and yet to differ with respect to what 
they know. this diagnosis crucially rests on the (suppressed) premise that 
the perception of the bird is evidence for the novice as it is evidence in the 
hands of the expert. As we have seen, the Evidentialist reply considered 
above did share this presupposition, as it tried to vindicate the claim that 
the expert and the non-expert have at their disposal different amounts 
of evidence by showing that the expert has at her disposal additional 
evidence which the non-expert fails to possess. however, this way of 
describing the situation is not mandatory. much depends on what one 
takes to be constitutive of evidence.
In response to this question E. conee has once returned the answer 
that any indication of a proposition’s truth should be regarded as evidence 
for that proposition (conee and Feldman 2004: 15, 252). As to the related 
question about what “sorts of things count as genuine indications of the 
truth of propositions” (bonJour 2007: 159) the idea – conveyed under the T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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heading of “seeming evidentialism” (sE) – is that anything which might 
seem to a person to bear on the truth of a proposition should be regarded 
as an indication in a sense relevant for its constituting genuine evidence 
(conee and Feldman 2004: 15). sE implies that a piece of information held 
by a person could not be taken to be evidence for a given proposition 
p unless it seems to that person that that piece of information bears on 
the truth of p; so sE would seem to make available to the Evidentialist a 
different diagnosis of the scenario considered above.
since she is a fresh trainee, the non-expert bird-watcher does not have 
the slightest idea as to how X-birds typically look like (one can take this 
to be somewhat constitutive of her lack of expertise). therefore, even if 
she perceptually discriminates the X-exemplar in all its relevant details, 
she is not in a position to appraise the visual information she gathers as 
an indication of the fact that the bird in view belongs to species X. If it 
is so, however, sE will predict that this information is not evidence for 
the proposition that the bird is an X, and this might well seem enough 
to explain, in evidential terms, the different epistemological merits of 
the expert and the non-expert’s beliefs: even if the relevant evidence 
is set in the background, and so is unsuited to explain the epistemic 
merits of what the expert is currently believing qua evidence, it seems 
safe to assume that its role will be reflected by the expert’s unmediated 
disposition to believe, on the basis of what she is seeing, that the bird 
is an X; so, although both beliefs will have been formed on the basis of 
the same information, just the first will have been formed on the basis 
of evidence; so the second, predictably enough, will not constitute 
knowledge, while the first almost certainly will.
despite it points in the right direction, also this reply seems to have 
its own problems though. sure, the distinction it introduces between 
information possessed, and evidence seems to be correct: although there 
seems to be no denying that the non-expert bird-watcher does acquire 
visual information from the X-bird upon attentively looking at it, the claim 
that she thereby comes in possession of evidence for the proposition that 
it is an X seems to be much more dubious. however, sE seems unsuited 
to deliver a satisfactory explanation of why it is so.
to begin with, sE seems to have its own problems, and in particular 
the problem – outlined by l. bonJour – that it seems to allow for an undue 
proliferation of evidence: to name just one dubious consequence of the 
view under discussion, for instance, sE seems to imply that “for someone 
to whom it seems that a certain sort of physical appearance shows 
that a person is a witch, that sort of appearance really is evidence of 
witchhood” (2007: 160). to the extent to which we are unwilling to qualify 
as “evidence” subjective and probably misguided impressions, like the T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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delusional thought that a woman with a gothic look and dressed all black 
will most probably be a witch, sE then seems to provide no attractive 
answer to the question about what is constitutive of evidence.
the latter point should not be underestimated: under one modest 
reading, it could just seem to convey a terminological remark, i.e. a plead 
for reserving the label “evidence” just to those things, whatever they 
are, which are able to confer justification on someone’s beliefs. were it 
so, this point would be most welcomed by those who like philosophical 
theories which are conservative with respect to common usage. In fact 
we commonly say things like “mr President was condemned on the 
evidence delivered by an eye witness”, or “these footprints in the snow 
are evidence that someone passed by during the night”, and so just a 
theory which identified evidence with justification-providing evidence 
could seem able to comply with the pre-philosophical understanding of 
the label. however, the problem is not just a matter of style, as it would 
be if the relevant disagreement occurred between those who care, and 
those who do not care for philosophy’s continuity with respect to common 
usage. the most urgent problem is that sE, by issuing the prediction that 
the witch-belief would be based on evidence, threatens to imply that the 
belief is epistemically justified, a consequence which could fly in the face 
of the general agreement that witches do not exist. sure, if by “evidence” 
one does not mean right from the start justification-providing evidence, 
the latter consequence is not immediate: a person might have evidence for 
a proposition, and yet fail to be justified because believing the proposition 
might be an unfitting attitude to take (coming back from work I see my 
wife’s car parked in front of our house; if I were to take it as an indication 
of the fact that, despite she arrived at home first, she is not anymore 
there, because in the meanwhile she has been abducted by the aliens, 
sE would imply that I have evidence for that proposition, yet, since the 
belief does not fit this evidence, that I would not be justified); however, 
if one also believes – together with the Evidentialist – that justification 
is a matter of fit with the evidence, it seems to become unavoidable: for 
the very simple reason that if a person believes that every woman with 
a gothic look is a witch – and this belief is rightly counted as being part 
of the person’s evidence2 – she will form a belief which fits the evidence   
 
2  I think that the classification of the (arguably delusional) belief that every gothic-
looking girl is a witch as evidence could not be contested, not at least from the point 
of view of a considered Evidentialist. one may be led to deny that this belief is actually 
evidence for the proposition that someone is a witch on the ground that, differently than 
a perception as of someone with a gothic look, it is a generalization which, on its own 
terms, is neutral as to whether someone is or is not a witch. however, remember that 
the most promising strategy which the Evidentialist has at her disposal to preserve EJT. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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whenever she will come to believe, upon seeing a woman with a similar 
look, that that woman is actually a witch. whatever it is meant by saying 
that belief in a proposition fits the evidence, in fact, it seems that belief 
in a logical consequence of one’s evidence should be regarded as an 
epistemic attitude which fits this evidence. the same problem can be 
illustrated in a variety of different ways: suppose, just to give a further 
example, that a person believes that tea leaves arranged in a certain way 
indicate that the weather will turn to rain; if it is so, whenever she will 
recognise that pattern of arrangement, she will apprehend the tea leaves 
as evidence for the proposition that the weather is going to change, and 
her belief that the weather will turn to rain will fit the evidence, and so 
it will be justified.
In addition, even if we were to accept it as an intrinsically acceptable, 
it seems that sE could not deliver the materials needed to counter on 
a principled basis the objection levelled at the beginning of this paper 
against EJ. the problem is that, even if sE may sustain the thought that 
the non-expert bird watcher does not have evidence for the belief that 
the bird is an X, and so explain, consistently with EJ, why just the expert 
knows, it seems unsuited to counter, in the same way, a suitably modified 
version of the counterexample at issue. Just suppose, in addition, that 
the novice bird-watcher, upon receiving the visual information from the 
bird, also happens (for no reason whatsoever) to have the inclination 
to take it as an indication of the fact that the bird is an X. In a similar 
possible (unlikely, yet conceivable) situation, sE still commits to regarding 
the visual presentation of the bird, as experienced by the non-expert, 
as evidence she has for (and upon which she bases the belief in) the 
proposition that the bird is an X; yet, also in this case we seem compelled 
to deny to her belief the status of knowledge. so, again, we are back to 
the initial problem: since the expert, upon basing her belief on the visual 
presentation of the bird, comes to know that it is an X, and the non-expert, 
upon basing the same belief on the same evidence, does not, we seem to 
have a counterexample to the claim that any such difference will always 
have to be explained in terms of the different amount of evidence they 
possess. so, I believe that the Evidentialist, if she is to have any chance 
of solving the problem, should really look in a different direction. one 
possibility is the following.
  on the face of the bird-watcher example is to credit the expert with additional evidence, 
and in particular with some generalization as to how X-birds typically look like. so, 
an Evidentialist which is in the business to pursue this strategy could not coherently 
deny the evidence-status to the belief about how witches look like on the grounds that 
it is a generalization, because she is committed to acknowledging that status to the 
generalization as to how X-birds typically look like.T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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Also from the standpoint of an Evidentialist, it should sound as a 
truism that a person’s justification does not solely depend on the evidence 
one has, but also on the way in which different pieces of evidence 
actually interact with one another. with this, I just want to exploit the 
rather harmless observation (which EJ, in the form I have considered it, 
somewhat conceals) that whether a person, on the basis of her global 
evidence (E1 ... En), is justified in entertaining a given proposition does 
not solely depend on the nature of each and every Ek which belongs 
therein; it obviously also depends on the way in which these evidential 
items combine together. whether a given Ek does supply a justification 
for believing a proposition, in other words, often depends on what 
further evidence Ek1 ... Ekn one has, and this in either of the following 
two senses: believing the target proposition may fit less Ek alone, than 
it fits Ek plus other evidence one has; or believing the target proposition 
may fit more Ek alone, than it fits Ek plus other evidence one has: in the 
latter case the additional evidence will probably defeat the justification 
which supervenes on Ek alone. let us however concentrate on the first 
case, the case in which the degree of fit (and, along with EJ, the degree 
to which a belief is justified) is greater when Ek is combined with other 
evidence one possesses than it would have been otherwise. let us dub 
the case at issue one in which the relevant pieces of evidence interact 
constructively.
It is arguable that constructive interaction is a vast category, and 
that it comes in at least two varieties which deserve being singled out 
separately. one mode of interaction is addition: this is arguably the way 
in which two distinct and convergent testimonies as to some p combine, 
thereby supplying a justification for the belief that p which is stronger 
than the justification supplied by just one of them; or it is the way in which 
more instances of a given generalization combine, thereby supplying 
an (inductive) justification for it which is stronger than the justification 
supplied by less instances of the same generalization. Arguably, one 
fundamental feature of interaction by addition – above and beyond the 
fact that it results in a degree of justification which is greater than it 
would have been otherwise – is that each piece of information could not 
so interact unless, in itself, it were not capable of supplying some positive 
degree of justification: for a subject who knows nothing about a given 
generalization – so for a subject committed to stay neutral as to whether 
it is true – the observation of just one instance of it should be taken to 
supply some positive degree of justification, one which, although in a 
small measure, will raise the generalization’s probability. In the same 
way, for a subject who knows nothing about whether p has been the case, 
so for a subject committed to stay neutral as to whether the proposition T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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is true, one testimony in favour of p supplies some positive degree of 
justification, one which will raise p’s probability. what happens as new 
evidence is acquired (either new testimonies are delivered, or more 
observational data which confirm the generalization are gathered) is just 
that the strength of the previous justification increases. It is important to 
focus on this feature of interaction by addition, because, arguably, it is 
what differentiates it from the second variety of constructive interaction 
I want to present.
Just consider the following (rather artificial) case: an astronomer 
has at her disposal just two telescopes, one of which is an ultrareliable 
instrument, while the other is not reliable at all. say that the first one, 
call it A, is such that whenever you see (what seems to be) a star while 
observing the night sky through it, the probability of the star’s being 
there is very, very high; b, the other telescope, has the opposite feature: 
whenever you see (what seems to be) a star while observing the night sky 
through it, the probability of the star’s not being there (your impression 
to the contrary being aroused by any of many possible malfunctioning) 
is very, very high. Now suppose that the astronomer looks through one 
of the telescopes, and sees something which looks very much like a star 
(call this evidence E). It is sensible to believe that if the astronomer is 
using A, E justifies the astronomer in believing that there is a star over 
there to a rather high degree; on the other hand, if the astronomer is 
using b, the opposite conclusion would seem to be better justified: in that 
case it would be very unlikely that there really is a star over there. the 
problem, however, is that A and b are indistinguishable: the astronomer, 
by simply looking at it, cannot tell whether it is A or b which she is using. 
however suppose that a clever student of the astronomer figured out a 
method to tell A apart from b, and that after having put this method into 
practice, she tells the astronomer that he has been using A (call this 
additional evidence E*). obviously, E and E* interact constructively: for 
the astronomer, the belief that there is a star over there is now justified, 
on the basis of E plus E*, better than it was justified on the basis of E 
alone. this time, however, this is true much for the reason that the belief 
that there is a star over there is justified for the first time, as, E alone 
(namely, unaided with the information as to which telescope has been 
used) supplies to the astronomer no degree of justification for either 
believing, or disbelieving that there is a star over there. For this very 
reason I propose to label this way in which two pieces of information my 
combine interaction by enabling function: the contribution of E* is not just 
to add to the strength of a justification that has already been supplied by 
E; as it were, its function is to disclose the epistemic potential of E which, 
if E* had not been produced, would have remained un-actualized.T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
52  Veritas, v. 55, n. 2, maio/ago. 2010, p. 42-59
Now, the intuition underlying the Evidentialist’s response to the bird-
watcher’s example, reviewed at the beginning of this paper, would seem 
to be that the difference between the novice and the expert is made by a 
piece of information which enables (in the expert’s case), and would have 
enabled, yet since it is not possessed it does not enable (in the novice’s 
case), the visual presentation of the bird to supply a justification for the 
belief that it is an X. For it seems intuitive that the novice, who lacks 
the additional information (the ornithological back-ground knowledge), 
is justified to no degree in believing that the bird, as it happens to be 
the case, is an X; that which sustains the diagnosis that the information 
which is missing (in the case of the novice) and is arguably possessed 
(in the case of the expert) could not have interacted with the information 
which both have (the visual presentation they possess) by addition. the 
problem which has emerged, as it will be remembered, was however that 
the additional enabling evidence, since it is not entertained consciously, 
could not be taken to be possessed in some central sense; and that 
the obvious alternative, that it was possessed, yet in the (derivative) 
dispositional sense, in turn has proven useless; for the best we can expect 
from dispositional evidence is dispositional justification, whereas it has 
appeared clear that the expert, who transitions to the belief that the bird 
is an X on the basis of her perception of it, is occurrently, and not just 
dispositionally justified.
however, once the model of interaction by enabling function has been 
brought into plain view, there seems to be a clear way in which the basic 
suggestion proposed by the Evidentialist could be preserved consistently 
with the observation that the relevant background knowledge is not 
(occurrently) possessed; in fact, until now, we have placed no significant 
constrain as to what could enable one piece of information to perform an 
evidential function; so, although the model has been illustrated in light 
of an example in which this role is discharged by an additional piece of 
evidence (the information that the telescope used by the astronomer was 
A) there is no apparent reason why we should believe that something 
else could not discharge that role.
consider the following example, which is supposed to pave the way 
for a broadened model of the interaction by enabling function. mafalda, 
a four-years girl, is brought to the zoo by his father; since he has already 
been there many times, mafalda has now learned to tell a leopard apart 
from a cheetah. so, when they both look into the cage where five cheetahs 
are sleeping, mafalda comes to know that it is cheetahs, and not – say 
– leopards, that she is seeing. however mafalda has not yet learned to 
count, so although what he sees allows her to know what animals there 
are in the cage, the very same information doesn’t allow her to know T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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that the cage contains five animals. what we have here, it would seem, 
is a case in which the very same piece of information I which mafalda 
acquires by looking into a cage is evidence for a proposition, yet is not 
evidence for a different proposition; and this makes almost irresistible 
the thought that the difference must be explained by supposing that 
an enabling condition is operative, in so far as the evidential status of I 
relative to the first proposition is concerned, and that a different condition, 
whose satisfaction would have enabled I to count as evidence for the 
second proposition, is not operative3. by the same token, it appears clear 
that both the first and the second enabling conditions do not require 
mafalda to possess additional evidence; what they require is that mafalda 
possesses a cognitive ability: it is because mafalda is able to tell a leopard 
apart from a cheetah that she is allowed to learn, upon looking into the 
cage, that it contains cheetahs; and it is because she does not have the 
ability to count that the very same visual information has no cognitive 
significance relative to how many cheetah it does contain. so, we have 
a case in which it is (the exercise of) a cognitive ability which interacts 
with a piece of information by enabling its evidential function, and not, as 
in the astronomer’s case, some additional piece of evidence. so, we seem 
to have all the materials for explaining what is going on in the expert’s 
case consistently with the observation that he does not possess (in some 
central sense) additional enabling evidence; for even if the function of the 
expert’s background knowledge is not to contribute additional evidence, 
it is sensible to believe that what constitutes her very expertise is the 
possession of an ability – which at times may be manifested in the form 
of a piece of propositional knowledge, yet does not necessarily coincide 
 
 
3  I think that a person like mafalda who is not able to count need not be disqualified as 
one who also fails to possess the relevant numerical concepts. were it so, mafalda’s 
inability to discern, on the basis of what she is seeing, that the cage in view contains 
five animals could be explained, more straightforwardly, by observing that she is 
not able to entertain thoughts having the concept of five as an ingredient. Also in 
this case, I believe, the advertised dependence of the evidential status of the visual 
information acquired by mafalda on the possession of the relevant ability would be 
vindicated; the general suggestion, in this case, would become that the evidential 
status of information should be taken to depend on the possession of the concepts 
which are needed to grasp the propositions this information is possibly evidence for 
(as we will see, this suggestion is almost implicit whenever the relevant concept, 
differently than a numerical concept, is a recognitional one). however, it is also fair 
to admit that the possession of the concept of five does not seem to be constrained 
by the possession of the ability to identify, perceptually, groups of five members. 
so, mafalda might well be able to grasp a proposition having as ingredient the 
concept of five, and yet, as in the present case, fail to possess the ability to count 
up to five.T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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with it4 – which enables the visual information she has acquired to perform 
an evidential function; and what explains the fact that the novice, who 
holds the same information, does not come to know on its basis what 
the expert knows, is simply that the novice, differently than the expert, 
does not possess the relevant ability, and so for this reason just possesses 
information, and not evidence.
of course, as it is well-known, it is not very clear, from a philosophical 
point of view, what an ability (in particular, as contrasted with an 
opportunity) should be supposed to be. however, one thing seems clear: 
the relevant ability is an ability to process information in a certain way; 
so, it is sensible to expect that considerations of an information-theoretic 
nature may help clarify, at least to a certain extent, what, in the particular 
case at issue, an ability should be taken to be. here is something which 
F. dretske (1999) may offer to us which is highly relevant to the case at 
issue.
Quite interestingly, dretske distinguishes among sensory experience 
and cognition, the conceptual use of the information made available 
by the former. According to the proposal at issue, the main difference 
between the both is that they code information in different ways. It 
is customary to notice that the information relative to some property 
of a given source may be coded either in a analogical or in a digital 
way, depending on whether the value of this property is represented 
continuously or discretely5. dretske’s distinction, although it is conveyed 
by resorting to the very same vocabulary, concerns the way in which a 
system may encode the distinct piece of information that a given source 
instantiates a given property with a given magnitude: in other words, 
not information about properties, but about the facts that may have those 
properties as constituents. so what dretske is after is a distinction, 
essentially paralleling the first one, among the way a given system may   
 
4  I take the relevant ability to be practical; in particular, I believe that it should be 
identified with a recognitional ability of some sort. this is the reason why I believe 
that the ability which makes the difference between the expert and the novice may at 
times be manifested in the form of explicit knowledge as to how X-birds look like, yet 
does not need coincide with it. what is constitutive of a practical ability is that whoever 
possesses it knows how to do a certain thing – in the case at issue how to recognize an 
X-bird –, not that she is also able, in each and every occasion in which she exercises it 
successfully, to state in explicit terms what criteria govern its exercise.
5  the speedometer of a car encodes in an analogical way information about its speed 
because, at least to some extent, to every state of the speedometer there corresponds 
a value of the car’s speed; the light of a dashboard which registers oil-pressure, on the 
other hand, encodes information about the pressure of the oil in a digital way, because 
the encoding system has just two states at its disposal, one that encodes the information 
that the pressure has a smaller value than some suitably chosen v, and another that 
encodes the information that the pressure has a value which is equal to, or greater than v.T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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represent the information, for instance, that a car has a speed of 40 km 
per hour (as contrasted with a system representing a speed of 40 km 
per hour).
According to dretske, in order for the information that S is P to 
be encoded in a digital way by a given structure the most specific 
information encoded by this structure must be the information that S is P; 
by contrast, the very same information will be encoded in an analogical 
way whenever there will be some more specific information about S 
carried by the structure other than the information that S is P. one case 
in point is the different way in which a picture, and a statement, typically 
code information, say the information that a given car is red: a picture 
normally (even if not necessarily) encodes this information analogically 
because it typically portrays the car within a context, as having certain 
dimensions, a given shape, etc. moreover, and most inescapably, it 
represents the car as being of a particular red, illuminated in a certain 
way, etc. contrast now a picture of the red car with the sentence “the 
car is red”: the sentence, too, conveys the information that the car is red; 
yet it just conveys the information that the car is red, so, a fortiori, this is 
information is the most specific information about the car it encodes; this 
is why the sentence, differently than the picture, codes this information 
in a digital way.
dretske actually puts the distinction already introduced at the service 
of explaining, in information-theoretic terms, what happens when, on 
the basis of a perception, someone acquires full cognitive awareness 
of something which is presented through it. to begin with, dretske 
maintains – plausibly enough – that a perception normally encodes 
far more information than a belief, based on it, may finally encode. 
so a perception will typically code this information in an analogical 
way, while the belief will encode this information in a digital way. the 
transition can then be portrayed as one whereby the information which 
is embedded in analogical form within our experience is extracted from it 
and converted in digital form. this analogical-digital conversion qualifies 
as generalization and a fully epistemic classification because it involves 
a loss of information that is consequent on a process whereby individual 
differences (the features of the particular red of the car, for instance) 
are disregarded, and treated as being of essentially the same kind. As 
dretske puts it:
“digital conversion is a process in which irrelevant pieces of information 
are pruned away and discarded. until information has been lost, or 
discarded, an information processing system has failed to treat different 
things as essentially the same. It has failed to classify or categorize, T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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failed to generalize, failed to ‘recognize’ the input as being an instance 
(token) of a more general type. […] cognitive activity is the conceptual 
mobilization of incoming information, and this conceptual treatment 
is fundamentally a matter of ignoring differences (as irrelevant to the 
underlying sameness), of going from the concrete to the abstract, of 
passing from the particular to the general. It is, in short, a matter of 
making the analog-digital transformation.” (ibidem, 141, 142)
what is important, in the present context, is that dretske’s account 
of conceptualization and classification allows us to give a more precise 
content to the intuitive characterization of a cognitive ability introduced 
above. the simple suggestion is that the relevant cognitive ability must 
be one which encapsulates the digital-conversion unit which is selectively 
responsive to the information, coded in an analogical way by the relevant 
experiential presentation, which (belief in) the proposition eventually 
comes to represent in a digital way. A concept will typically embody 
such conversion unit: according to c. Peacocke (1992), for instance, the 
conditions which someone must satisfy if she is to possess the concept 
of red is that she must be primitively disposed to transition to belief 
that something is red if presented with something which appears to her 
as being red. so the concept of red, according to Peacocke, is a mental 
structure whose proper function is to extract pertinent information to 
the effect that something is red from its analogical sensory presentation, 
and to encode it in a digital way. this, as hinted at before, would be 
a case in which the evidential import of the information encoded by 
perception is constrained by the possession of the relevant ability in 
the more straightforward sense that a person unequipped by such an 
ability is unable to grasp the propositions this information is evidence 
for. At the same time, the ability to count can now be illuminated as the 
digital-conversion unit which constrains the epistemic significance of 
mafalda’s visual presentation of the animals in the cage: unless mafalda’s 
psychological architecture sustains the relevant conversion unit, the 
information that there are five cheetahs in the cage, which is coded 
in an analogical way by his perception, although one which she will 
possess (she sees five cheetahs), will be cognitively unavailable to her 
(she does not see that the cheetahs are five).
the general moral that the preceding considerations make available 
is that the evidential import of a given body of information I, relative 
to a given proposition p, is conditional on the possession of a mental 
structure S needed to select from I the relevant part which, eventually 
coded in digital form, becomes cognitive possession in the form of a 
belief that p.T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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It is important, in the present context, to stress that the presence of 
the relevant conversion unit does not constrain in any significant way 
the nature of the information I which is part of the “sensory information 
store” potentially serving as evidence for the purpose of justifying one’s 
beliefs. A child which we would ordinarily characterize as lacking the 
capacity to discriminate a daffodil need not be regarded as “perceptually 
deficient” when he looks at a yellow flower, and yet is unable to return 
the answer that it is a daffodil.
“what the pupil needs is not more information of the sort that could be 
supplied by the use of a magnifying glass. […] the requisite (requisite 
to identifying the flower as a daffodil) information is getting in. what is 
lacking is an ability to extract this information, an ability to decode or 
interpret the sensory message” (ibidem, 144).
In other words, for that pupil it is not information to the effect that the 
flower is a daffodil that is lacking; rather, it is evidence for that proposition 
that, courtesy of the missing ability, is not there to sustain an intelligent 
transition to the corresponding belief. the expert’s (the novice’s) situation 
can be described in essentially the same terms. the novice does enjoy 
all the information which would be sufficient, for someone endowed with 
the relevant ability, also to enjoy the evidence in light of which the belief 
that the bird is an X. however, he does not possess the relevant pieces 
of ornithological knowledge that sustain the expert’s cognitive routine, 
and so fails to have evidence in the very first place. therefore, predictably 
enough, he does not know either.
***
In this paper, my principal concern has been the notion of expert 
knowledge, and the account of it which the current view on epistemic 
justification known as Evidentialism is bound to propose. In particular, 
I have concentrated on the standard implication of Evidentialism, 
according to which the same belief could not be justified differently for 
two different persons (or for the same person at different times) unless 
these persons (or the same person at different times) had not different 
evidence. As far as the way in which expert knowledge is understood 
in this paper, the latter implication is prima facie problematic: for an 
expert is exactly the kind of person from which knowledge (and so better 
justification) is expected in situations in which a non-expert would not 
know (would have a worse justification). If a situation is understood as 
defined by the information which is available in it (so as an informational T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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situation), the latter understanding of expert knowledge makes almost 
irresistible the conclusion that an expert who knows a given proposition 
in an informational situation in which a non-expert does not could not 
differ from the second for the evidence she has. the final part of the paper 
has been devoted at resisting the latter line of thought: in particular, 
drawing on a suggestion presented by conee, I have suggested that the 
information held by a subject should be distinguished from the evidence 
this person has. conee, however, contends that the information available 
to a subject becomes evidence for a proposition when the person has 
an inclination to regard it as an indication of the truth of a proposition. 
my proposal differs from conee’s. First I differentiate between two ways 
in which distinct pieces of evidence may interact constructively, i.e. by 
supplying – in conjunction – a justification for a proposition that is stronger 
than the justification which each of them – in isolation – would have made 
available. the first more intuitive way is by addition: in this case, the 
strength of the (conjunctive) justification is a function of the strength of 
the justification independently supplied by each conjunct. A second way 
of constructive interaction is less apparent, and it is the way in which two 
pieces of information interact when one becomes evidence for the first 
time only when (and only because) a second information is added. I have 
found it congenial to dub this kind of interaction by enabling function. As 
I have tried to show, this model of interaction generalizes interestingly 
when we see that an enabling condition, which sometimes is met because 
a second piece of (enabling) information is added, may sometimes be 
fulfilled because a subject possesses a cognitive ability, which is the 
ability to process a first piece of information in a full cognitive way. In 
some central cases, the relevant ability will be the one which underlies 
the possession of the concepts involved by some target proposition; and 
in these cases it will be straightforward that a first piece of information 
will be evidence for the proposition only if processed by resorting to the 
that cognitive ability: in a similar situation, a person unequipped with 
this ability will be most directly unable to grasp the proposition at issue, 
and so, predictably enough, the information at issue will not count as 
evidence for that proposition which she will have at her disposal. In other 
cases this will not be so, and a person lacking the relevant ability will be 
able to grasp a proposition, and simply fail to possibly entertain evidence 
for it. both cases are explained, information-theoretically, by supposing 
that the ability at issue sustains the conversion-unit which is needed to 
process the first information in a fully cognitive way.
once the distinction at issue is brought in plain view, Evidentialism is 
not anymore incapable to account for expert knowledge: once we see that 
information and evidence are not one and the same thing, the observation T. Piazza – Expert Knowledge, Evidence, and Information
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that an expert knows precisely in those informational situations in which 
a non-expert would not know no longer establishes the claim that the 
different epistemic merit of their beliefs cannot be explained in evidential 
terms. As far as an expert has cognitive abilities which a non-expert 
lacks, she will have more evidence than a non-expert, even if both will 
possess the same information.
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